COMMENTS
Post-Majority Child Support in Washington
Since 1597, when England first imposed criminal penalties
for nonsupport of legitimate children,' the law of child support
has undergone a metamorphosis. From this modest beginning
child support law evolved, eventually imposing civil penalties for
nonsupport,' and finally recognizing that this obligation exists
regardless of a child's legitimacy.' The current thrust of its growth
extends this duty to children beyond that mystical age of majority.4 The Washington Supreme Court presently is considering the
appeal of Childers v. Childers,5 which questions whether Washington courts may order post-majority support under the Wash1. And be it further enacted, That the Father and Grandfather, and the
Mother and Grandmother, and the Children, of everie poore olde blinde and
impotente pson, or othere poor pson not able to worke, beinge of a sufficient
abilitie, shall at their own Chardges releive and maintaine everie suche poore
pson, in that manner and accordinge to that rate, as by the Justices of the Peace
of that Countie where such sufficient psons dwell, or the greater number of
them, at their genall Quarter Sessions shalbe assessed; upon paine that everie
one of them shall forfeite Twentie shilling for everie monethe whiche they shall
fail therein.
43 ELIZ. I, c. 2, § 6 (1601) (first enacted in 1597 as part of the Elizabethan Poor Law)
(abolished by the National Assistance Act, 11 and 12 GEO. 6, c. 29, § 1 (1948)). Before
1597, parents had only a moral obligation to support their children. Bazley v. Forder, L.R.
3 Q.B. 559 (1868). See also Cissna v. Beaton, 2 Wash. 2d 491, 493, 98 P.2d 651, 652 (1940).
For a historical development of the obligation of child support, see Greenspan v. Slate,
12 N.J. 426, 97 A.2d 390 (1953).
2. Tomkins v. Tomkins, 11 N.J. Eq. 512 (Ch. 1858); Mortimore v. Wright, 6 M.&W.
482 (Exch. Div. 1840); Van Valkinburgh v. Watson, 13 Johns (N.Y.) 480 (Sup. Ct. 1816).
3. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 7-1121 (Supp. 1977):

In a proceeding in which the court has made an order of filiation, the court
shall direct a father possessed of sufficient means or able to earn such means to
pay monthly or at other fixed periods a fair and reasonable sum for the support
and education of the child until the child is eighteen (18) years of age ...
[Tihe court may, in its discretion, order the continuation of support payments
until the child discontinues his education or reaches the age of twenty-one (21)
years, whichever is sooner.
See also OR. REv. STAT. § 109.103 (1973); WASH. Rav. CODE § 26.26 (1976). See generally
30 Mo. L. REv. 154 (1965).

4. See, e.g., Strom v. Strom, 13 111.App. 2d 354, 142 N.E.2d 172 (1957); Commonwealth ex rel. Decker v. Decker, 204 Pa. Super. 156, 203 A.2d 343 (1964); In re Marriage
of Melville, 11 Wash. App. 879, 526 P. 2d 1228 (1974). The current age of majority in
Washington is eighteen. WASH. REv.

CODE

§ 26.28.010 (1976).

5. 15 Wash. App. 792, 552 P.2d 83 (1976), pet. for review granted, 88 Wash. 2d 1006
(1977) (No. 44555).
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ington Dissolution of Marriage Act. The court's resolution of that
question will determine whether the law of child support emerges
from its cocoon a moth or a butterfly.
To appreciate fully the question posed in Childers, one must
grasp the function and purpose of child support. Simply stated,
the purpose of child support is to provide necessary elements of
support to those typically incapable of self-support.' The definition of "necessary elements" constantly changes to meet the demands of an increasingly complex society. And although child
support is limited to necessities, what is necessary also depends
upon the social status and financial resources of the parents and
is not limited to bare essentials unless those criteria so dictate.'
Accordingly, courts retain continuing jurisdiction to modify support decrees as the ability of the parents to provide support and
the needs of the children change.' In light of the purpose of child
support, this comment explores the extent to which Washington
courts may order post-majority child support and the sources of
to do so.
Washington courts potentially derive authority to order postmajority child support from three sources: Washington's common
law, which permits post-majority support under limited circumstances; 0 the state's Dissolution of Marriage Act, which may or
may not permit orders for post-majority support, depending upon
the state supreme court's disposition of the Childers appeal;" and
the state's Uniform Parentage Act,12 yet to be construed by the
state's high court. Each of these three will be considered in turn
to determine whether their application fulfills the purpose of
child support and, with regard to the statutory sources, the purpose of the legislation. 3
6. WASH. Rav. CODE §§ 26.09.010-.902 (1976).
7. Puckett v. Puckett, 76 Wash. 2d 703, 458 P.2d 556 (1969); In re Hudson, 13 Wash.
2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942) (dictum).
8. Newell v. Newell, 146 Cal. App. 2d 166, 303 P.2d 839 (1956); Haag v. Haag, 240
Ind. 291, 163 N.E.2d 243 (1959); Crafts v. Carr, 24 R.I. 397, 53 A. 275 (1902).
9. Herzog v. Herzog, 23 Wash. 2d 382, 161 P.2d 142 (1945); Ruge v. Ruge, 97 Wash.
51, 165 P. 1063 (1917)(dictum); Harris v. Harris, 71 Wash. 307, 128 P. 673 (1912).
10. See text accompanying notes 14-23 infra.
11. See text accompanying notes 24-37 infra.
12. WASH. Rav. CODE §§ 26.26.010-.905 (1976). See text accompanying notes 39-43

infra.
13. Because Washington does not reproduce for distribution any legislative history
per se, this comment's references to and inferences of legislative intent are necessarily
derived from the only manifestations of such intent available: the language of the statutes
considered.
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Under Washington's common law, the state's courts recognized a limited parental obligation of post-majority child support; the general rule terminating child support when children
attained majority 4 bore only two exceptions. First, the courts
could order support for mentally or physically handicapped children beyond their minority. 5 Consistent with the purpose of child
support, this exception permitted the state's courts to order continuing support for those children incapable of self-support. Although support for a handicapped child continued as long as the
child's need," such a support order must have been entered during the child's minority; 7 the state's common law imposed no
parental obligation to support children becoming handicapped
after attaining majority.' 8
The common law's second exception permitted Washington
courts to incorporate extrajudical post-majority support agreements into divorce decrees.' 9 The Divorce Act of 1949,20 however,
eliminated the courts' jurisdiction to enforce such agreements in
an action on the divorce decree once the child attained majority,2 '
relegating the child to a separate action for contractual remedies.22 Thus, the state's common law authorized post-majority
support orders (1) for handicapped children, and (2) for normal
children, but only in divorce actions when their parents had
agreed to provide such support. 3
14. Riser v. Riser, 7 Wash. App. 647, 501 P.2d 1069 (1972); Evans v. Evans, 116 Wash.
460, 199 P. 764 (1921).
15. Van Tinker v. Van Tinker, 38 Wash. 2d 390, 229 P.2d 333 (1951); Schultz v.
Western Farm Tractor Co., 111 Wash. 351, 190 P. 1007 (1920).
16. Schultz v. Western Farm Tractor Co., 111 Wash. 351, 190 P. 1007 (1920).
17. Mallen v. Mallen, 4 Wash. App. 185, 480 P.2d 219 (1971); Van Tinker v. Van
Tinker, 38 Wash. 2d 390, 229 P.2d 333 (1951).
18. Moss v. Moss, 163 Wash. 444, 1 P.2d 916 (1931).
19. "It is not for us to frustrate a father's well intentioned generosity for his children."
Bauer v. Bauer, 5 Wash. App. 781, 788, 490 P.2d 1350, 1353 (1971).
20. 1949 Wash. Laws, ch. 215, §§ 1-23.
21. Smith v. Smith, 4 Wash. App. 608, 484 P.2d 409 (1971); Mallen v. Mallen, 4
Wash. App. 185, 480 P.2d 219 (1971). But see Bauer v. Bauer, 5 Wash. App. 781, 490 P.2d
1350 (1971).
22. Thus, children lost the advantage of continuing judicial supervision of these
agreements, a benefit they enjoyed during minority. See Sheldon v. Superior Court, 257
Cal. App. 2d 541, 65 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1967); Herzog v. Herzog, 23 Wash. 2d 382, 161 P.2d
142 (1945).
23. The Washington legislature, concluding that the common law limitation of support exclusively to minor children often defeated the purpose of such support, enacted a
comprehensive pauper statute, 1854 Wash. Laws, at 395, § 2; CoDE OF 1881, § 2697; 1
HILL'S GEN. STAT. § 3088. Enumerated relatives of persons physically or mentally deficient
or otherwise incapable of self-support where required to contribute to the support of these
indigents. Id. Upon proof that a person was poor, Moss v. Moss, 163 Wash. 444, 1 P.2d
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The state legislature enacted the courts' second potential
source of authority for post-majority support orders, the Dissolution of Marriage Act, in 1973, repealing the Divorce Act of 1949.
Whereas the Divorce Act of 1949 had authorized courts awarding
divorces to "make provision for . . . the custody, support and
education of the minor children of such marriage,"4 thus expressly limiting child support to minority, the Dissolution Act
authorizes courts entering decrees of dissolution to order support
for "any child of the marriage entitled to support," 5 from
"parents owing a duty of support to any child of the marriage
dependent upon either or both spouses. '2 Washington appellate
courts, construing the Dissolution Act's support provisions, have
reached conflicting conclusions regarding authority for court ordered post-majority support. 7
Division Three of the Washington Court of Appeals, in In re
Marriageof Melville,2 1 upheld a child support order for "$100 per
month per child until such time as each child reaches the age of
18, or was sooner emancipated, or until the age of 21 if the child
was regularly enrolled in school. ' ' 29 In one brief paragraph, containing little more than a recitation of the relevant portion of the
Dissolution Act's section 170, the court determined that the act
"specifically confers upon a dissolution court jurisdiction to direct a parent to provide for the support and education of a child
after it attains majority. ' 30 Without supporting analysis, Division
Three concluded that the Dissolution Act authorized awards of
post-majority support.
916 (1931) ("poor" defined as dependent on public charity), and that a statutorily designated relative had adequate means, courts could order support, regardless of the indigent's
age. This pauper statute provided a vehicle for requiring parents to support their indigent
adult children. Although many states today have similar statutes, see generally Mandelker, Family Responsibility Under the American Poor Laws: I, 54 MicH. L. REv. 497
(1956), Washington's legislature repealed this state's pauper statute in 1937, 1937 Wash.
Laws, ch. 180, §§ 3, 22, when the state and its political subdivisions assumed the obligation to support the state's indigents. Id.
24. 1949 Wash. Laws, ch. 215, § 11.
25. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.050 (1976).
26. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.100 (1976).
27. Compare Childers v. Childers, 15 Wash. App. 792, 552 P.2d 83 (1976), with In re
Marriage of Melville, 11 Wash. App. 879, 526 P.2d 1228 (1974). Two commentators have

agreed, however, that the Dissolution Act grants authority to order post-majority support.
Holman, A Law in the Spirit of Conciliationand Understanding:Washington's Marriage
Dissolution Act, 9 GONZ. L. REv. 39 (1973); Rieke, The Dissolution Act of 1973: From
Status to Contract?, 49 WASH. L. Ray. 375 (1974).
28. 11 Wash. App. 879, 526 P.2d 1228 (1974).
29. Id. at 880, 526 P.2d at 1229.
30. Id. at 881, 526 P.2d at 1229.
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Two years later, in Childers v. Childers, Division One of the
Washington Court of Appeals reversed a post-majority child support award "of $150 per month to each of his three sons until each
son ceases to be enrolled in an accredited school. . . ,and ceases
to be otherwise dependent upon the parties."3 1 Citing section 100
of the Dissolution Act, the court found two requirements for imposition of a child support order: "(1) the parent to be subject to
the order must owe the child a duty of support, and (2) the child
must be dependent upon the parent. ' 32 Assuming the second requirement fulfilled, 33 the court began its "analysis" of the first.
Citing cases decided prior to and under the Divorce Act of 1949,
the court concluded that parents owe a duty of support only to
minor children, the only exception being the continuing obligation to support handicapped children.
The obvious fallacy in the Childers court's analysis is twofold. First, the court misused the state's common law. Finding
that courts could order support only from parents owing a duty
of support, the court correctly resorted to cases decided under the
common law and the Divorce Act of 1949 to define this class of
parents. The court determined that parents, at common law,
owed a duty of support only to their minor children. Then, instead of concluding that courts could order support only from this
class of parents, the court permitted the common law's temporal
constraint to dictate the parameters of court ordered support
under the new act; it concluded not only that courts could order
support only from parents owing a common law duty of support,
but also that courts could order support only to the extent of that
common law duty.
The court's misuse of the common law highlights its second
error: its misplaced reliance on the Dissolution Act's section
100. The purpose of section 100, entitled Child support-Apportionment of expense, is to allocate the burden of child support between the child's parents. The Dissolution Act's section
170,'3 in part entitled "Termination of. . . child support," determines the period during which the court-imposed obligation is
31. 15 Wash. App. at 793, 552 P.2d at 84.
32. Id. at 794, 552 P.2d at 84.
33. "We presume that a college student is dependent, especially so if his father is
under court order to provide full support." Id. Thus, the court found the child dependent
on the basis of a court order, issuance of which required that the child be dependent. This
exemplifies the bootstrapping logic the Childers court employed to restrict the Dissolution
Act's grant of authority.
34. See text accompanying note 46 infra.
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owing. Thus the court assumed the answer it sought, relying on
prior sources of authority without determining whether the new
act modified the terms of those prior sources.
Further, in response to an assertion of the Melville decision
as precedential authority for post-majority support awards, the
court declared that Melville was wrongly decided: "If section 170
should be so construed the privileges and immunities provision
of article 1 of our state constitution and the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would be violated."3 The
Childers court determined that these constitutional provisions
impose two requirements on any statutory classification: "(1)
[t]he legislation must apply alike to all persons within the designated class, and (2) reasonable ground must exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within the class and those who
do not. '3 Finding the first requirement met, the court determined the second was not, concluding "[tihere is no reasonable
ground to make a distinction between adult children of divorced
parents and adult children of married parents. ' 3 While the court
concluded from its equal protection analysis that section 170,
upon which Melville had relied, could not be construed to permit
post-majority support orders, this comment's ensuing treatment
of the issue 38 shows that the court's analysis was demonstrably
superficial. Thus with a modicum of effort (and analysis), the
Washington Court of Appeals divided on whether the Dissolution
Act authorizes post-majority child support awards.
The state legislature enacted the third potential source of
authority for post-majority child support, the Washington Uniform Parentage Act, in response to a series of Supreme Court
decisions according equal treatment to legitimate and illegitimate children in many substantive areas 39 and a threatened loss
35. 15 Wash. App. at 795, 552 P.2d at 85.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 796, 552 P.2d at 85. Although the quoted material would suggest the court
is critical of the classification of adult children of divorced parents versus adult children
of married parents, the court later declares "[tihere is no logical reason to require divorced parents to support their children . . . while married parents are free to bid their
children a fiscal farewell," id., suggesting that the court is criticizing the classification of
parents. While this articulation of the confronted issue typifies the court's reasoning
process, this comment concurs with the court's implicit perception of the issues, finding
that the same principles apply to the parents' duty and the children's right. Accordingly,
the equal protection analysis presented infra will refer, at times, to the children's right,
and at others, to the parents' duty.
38. See text accompanying notes 77-96 infra.
39. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535' (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S.
164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins.
Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); contra, Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
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of federal funds. 0 Replacing the Washington Filiation Proceeding
Statute,4 the Uniform Parentage Act basically provides a proceeding to establish the parent-child relationship and authorizes
courts to order parents to support their children. In determining
the amount and duration of such support, the act commands
courts to consider certain criteria, including the child's age,, and
the child's need and capacity for education, including higher education. 3 Although no Washington court has yet determined
whether the Parentage Act authorizes orders for post-majority
child support, the ensuing analysis will attempt to do so.
To determine whether the Parentage Act authorizes postmajority child support orders, and to resolve the conflict within
the Washington Court of Appeals as to whether the Dissolution
Act authorizes such orders, requires analysis of two questions; did
the legislature, through the Dissolution Act and the Parentage
Act, authorize the state's courts to award post-majority child
support, and if so; can the legislature grant courts authority to
order divorced parents and "single" parents to support their
adult children while not placing a similar duty on parents remaining married without violating equal protection principles?
Resolution of the first question requires careful analysis of
the specific language of each act's support provisions:
Dissolution Act § 050-In entering a decree of dissolution of
marriage . . . the court shall consider, approve, or make provision for . . . the support of any child of the marriage entitled
to support . . ..
Dissolution Act §100-In a preceeding for dissolution of marriage . . . after considering all relevant factors but without regard to marital misconduct, the court may order either or both
parents owing a duty of support to any child of the marriage
dependent upon either or both spouses to pay an amount reasonable or necessary for his support."
Dissolution Act §170-Unless otherwise agreed in writing or
40. The Social Security Amendments of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-60 (Supp. V 1975),
provided further incentive to enact the Uniform Parentage Act. This new law provides
that any state failing to establish satisfactory child support programs by the end of 1976
would lose five percent of the funds it receives for the Needy Family or Aid to Families
with Dependent Children programs. 41. For a history of Washington's filiation statutes, see State v. Coffey, 77 Wash. 2d
630, 465 P.2d 665 (1970).
42. WASH. RIV. CODE § 26.26.130(5)(f) (1976).
43. WASH. RV. CODE § 26.26.130(5)(e) (1976).
44. WASH. RV. CODE § 26.09.050 (1976).
45. WASH. RaV. CODE § 26.09.100 (1976).
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expressly provided in the decree, provisions for the support of a
child are terminated by emancipation of the child or by death
of the parent obligated to support the child.4"
Parentage Act §130(5)-In determining the amount to be paid
by a parent for support of the child and the period during which
the duty of support is owed, the court shall consider . . .(e) the
need and capacity of the child for education, including higher
the age of the child . . ..
education; [and] (f)
The Dissolution Act's section 170, besides codifying the common law exception permitting courts to incorporate parents' postmajority support agreements into dissolution decrees,48 specifically authorizes courts to expressly provide a time other than
children's emancipation for support termination.49 The provision's explicit language, "[u]nless otherwise . . . expressly provide in the decree, provisions for the support of a child are terminated by emancipation of the child,"5 stifles any argument that
the state legislature intended to limit support to minority., The
ensuing analysis of the Dissolution Act's sections 050 and 100
reveals nothing to contradict this conclusion.
The Dissolution Act's section 050 limits the state courts'
authority to ordering support for children "entitled to support";
the language "[iun entering a decree" suggesting that the chil-52
dren must be so entitled at the time the decree is entered.
Though the section is seemingly clear, its shortcoming is its failure to specify exactly which children are entitled to support. This
failure of definition, as the Childers court concluded, requires
resort to the state's common law to determine for whom courts
may order support.
The state's common law and prior statutes limited children
entitled to support to minor children53 except, of course, for the
46. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.170 (1976).
47. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.130(5) (1976).
48. See note 19 supra.
49. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. While, of course, one could argue that the terms of the Parentage Act's section
170 can be read to allow only pre-emancipation termination of child support, such an
argument flies in the face of the state's policy of protecting those children "virtually
helpless to affect their own economic future[sl." Childers v. Childers, 15 Wash. App. at
796, 552 P.2d at 85, quoting Puckett v. Puckett, 76 Wash. 2d 703, 706, 458 P.2d 556, 557
(1969).
52. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
53. In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942); State ex rel. Lucas v.
Superior Court, 193 Wash. 74, 74 P.2d 888 (1937).
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previously discussed narrowly defined exceptions. 5 Section 050,
therefore, seems merely to limit the courts' authority to ordering
support for children who are minors at the time the decree is
entered. This section suggests no temporal limitations on support
orders properly entered for children entitled to support.
The Dissolution Act's section 100 defines from whom courts
may order child support: from "parents owing a duty of support."
The language "[i]n a proceeding for dissolution" suggests this
duty of support must be owing at the time of the proceeding. 5
The act fails to specify which parents owe this duty of support,
again requiring resort to the common law. Under the state's common law, parents owed a duty to support only minor children. 56
In this respect, the Dissolution Act's section 100 is consistent with
its section 050; upon dissolution of marriage, the state's courts
may order support for minor children from parents of minor children. Section 100 further appears to limit the courts' authority to
ordering support from parents only so long as their children are
dependent children, 5 not minor children, as in the Divorce Act
of 1949.11 And although Washington's courts and legislature occasionally have defined dependent children to include only minor
children,5" the Dissolution Act's reference in a nonsupport related
provision 0 to "minor or dependent children" in the disjunctive
indicates the drafters recognized the difference and did not intend so to limit the term. Furthermore, although the term
"minor" appears in the Dissolution Act"' and was used in the
Divorce Act of 1949 to limit support," this term is absent from
the Dissolution Act's provisions authorizing and limiting the
courts' power to order support. 3 This affirmatively suggests legislative intent to extend the courts' authority to order support from
54. See text accompanying notes 15-23 supra.
55. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
56. In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942); Schultz v. Western Farm
Tractor Co., 111 Wash. 351, 190 P. 1007 (1920).
57. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
58. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
59. WASH. REv. CODE § 13.04.010 (1976); WASH. Rav. CODE § 74.12.010 (1976). Contra,
WASH. Rxv. CODE § 51.08.030 (1976); Lund v. Seattle, 163 Wash. 254, 1 P.2d 301 (1931);
Rochester v. Seattle, R. & S. Ry., 67 Wash. 545, 122 P. 23 (1912).
60. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.110 (1976) ("The court may appoint an attorney to
represent the interests of a minor or dependent child with respect to his custody, support,
and visitation.").
61. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 26.09.110 and .280 (1976).
62. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
63. See text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
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parents of dependent children, 4 not merely from parents of minor
children.
This analysis of the Dissolution Act's sections 050 and 100
suggests that the legislature intended to limit the state courts'
authority to ordering support for children who are minors at the
time of the decree, from parents owing a duty to support these
children. The only temporal limitation suggested by section 100
would require that the children be dependent upon either or both
parents, not that the children be minors. Thus these sections
support and further refine the conclusion drawn from section 170;
the state legislature, although permitting the courts to award
child support only during children's minority, intended to extend
the duration of the judicially imposed obligation to the period of
the children's dependence upon their parents. Providing this extended period of obligation is somewhat analogous to the common
law exception permitting courts to order post-majority support
for handicapped children;"5 it authorizes support for those children who, for one reason or another, are still incapable of selfsupport.
A similar analysis of the Parentage Act's support provision
produces a like result. The Parentage Act's section 130 provides:
"in determining . . . the amount . . . and the period during
which the duty of support is owed, the court shall consider...
(e) the need and capacity of the child for education, including
higher education, [and] (f) the age of the child." Considering a
child's need and capacity for higher education is meaningless
unless the courts can order parents to provide this element of
support. Children, however, ordinarily do not have the requisite
capacity for higher education until they have completed a secondary education, 6 which for most children occurs near the time they
attain majority. This is persuasive evidence that the statute authorizes post-majority support for illegitimate children, at least
for higher education. Further evidence of this authorization is, as
in the Dissolution Act, the presence of the terms "minor" and
"age of majority" in nonsupport related provisions of the Paren64. Although the legislature has apparently substituted dependency for minority, nowhere does the Dissolution Act define "dependent children." This comment suggests
"dependent" means "not economically self-sufficient." If the term is defined in reference
to the child's parents, the problem encountered by the Childers court is presented. See
note 33 supra.
65. See text accompanying notes 15-18 supra.
66. Pass v. Pass, 238 Miss. 449, 118 So. 2d 769 (1960); Jackman v. Short, 165 Or. 626,
109 P.2d 860 (1941); Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 224 P. 264 (1926).
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tage Act,67 and their absence from the act's support provision. 8
Were the Parentage Act intended to limit support to minority,
the legislature easily could have included one of these terms in
the act's support provision.
A construction of the Parentage Act authorizing postmajority support for illegitimate children further bolsters a similar construction of the Dissolution Act for children of divorced
parents. In a dissolution action, for example, a father could question the legitimacy of one of two young children. 9 If, in an action
under the Parentage Act joined with the dissolution action, 0 the
court entered a decree declaring the existence of the parent-child
relationship, the court could order support for the legitimized
child under the Parentage Act,7 including post-majority support.
The other child would be entitled to a support order only under
the Dissolution Act. If the Dissolution Act were construed to limit
support to the child's minority, the two children could receive
different support awards. Because both children are in similar
situations, both legitimate and both losing the guidance and nurture of one parent at an early age, such an anomolous result would
be contrary to reason and inconsistent with the presumption that
the legislature intends to create a uniform, harmonious system of
712
laws.
Construing the Parentage Act and the Dissolution Act to
authorize the state's courts to order post-majority support accords with Washington's policy favoring higher education." In its
67. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.040(4), .060(4), .090 (1976); WASH. REv. CODE §
26.32.040 (1976); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.37.010 (1976).
68. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
69. "[A] man presumed to be his father . . . may bring an action . . . (b) for the
WASH.
purpose of declaring the non-existence of the father and child relationship .
REV. CODE § 26.26.060(1) (1976).
70. "The action may be joined with an action for divorce, dissolution, annulment...
WASH. REV. CODE §
or any other civil action in which paternity is an issue .
26.26.080(1) (1976).
71. "The judgment and order may contain any other provision directed against the
WASH. REV.
appropriate party to the proceeding, concerning the duty of support .
CODE § 26.26.130(3) (1976).
72. In re Estates of Donnelly, 81 Wash. 2d 430, 502 P.2d 1163 (1972).
73. "That it is the public policy of the state that a college education should be had,
if possible, by all its citizens, is made manifest by the fact that the state of Washington
maintains so many institutions of higher learning at public expense." Esteb v. Esteb, 138
Wash. 174, 183, 244 P. 264, 267 (1926). See also Baker v. Baker, 80 Wash. 2d 736, 498 P.2d
315 (1972); Underwood v. Underwood, 162 Wash. 204, 298 P. 318 (1931). See generally
Note, The College Support Doctrine: Expanded Protection for the Offspring of Broken
Homes, 1969 WASH. U.L.Q. 425; and Note, College Education as a Legal Necessary, 18
VAND. L. REV. 1400 (1965).
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landmark decision, Esteb v. Esteb,74 the Washington Supreme
Court led the nation, declaring that a college education, in appropriate circumstances, 75 is a necessary element of child support.
The state legislature's lowering of the age of majority in 19717,
threatened this policy. Its subsequent enactment of the Parentage Act and the Dissolution Act, construed to permit postmajority support, guarantees this policy's continued vitality for
those perhaps most in need.
The foregoing analysis of the language of these statutes supports the conclusion that the legislature intended to extend the
authority of the state's courts to permit post-majority support
orders. Thus the second question is presented: can the legislature
authorize post-majority support awards for children of divorced
parents or for illegitimate children without imposing a similar
duty on married parents, consistently with equal protection
principles? Although this question has been raised only with respect to the Dissolution Act, the Parentage Act's provisions authorizing post-majority support for illegitimate children present
similar issues. Accordingly, the potential equal protection problems of each act will be analyzed simultaneously."
Although the fourteenth amendment guarantees equal protection of the laws, it does not prohibit all discriminatory classifications." Most statutory classifications will withstand equal protection challenges upon evidence of a mere rational nexus between the basis of the classification and a valid state purpose.79
Courts will sustain classifications impinging "fundamental"
rights, 0 or based upon "suspect" criteria, 8' however, only if they
74. 138 Wash. 174, 244 P. 264 (1926).
75. In Esteb, the only "appropriate circumstances" mentioned were that the child
was fit for her academic subject, and unfit for commercial work.
76. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.28.010 (1976).
77. Although the state could extend additional protection from discriminatory classifications to its citizens under its state constitution, the Washington courts have consistently regarded the state constitution's privileges and immunities clause, WASH. CONST.
art. 1, § 12, and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal
Constitution as "substantially identical." State v. Nixon, 10 Wash. App. 355, 517 P.2d
212 (1973); Olsen v. Delmore, 48 Wash. 2d 545, 295 P.2d 324 (1956); Texas Co. v. Cohn, 8
Wash. 2d 360, 112 P.2d 522 (1941). Accordingly, this comment's analysis should apply
with equal efficacy to both constitutional provisions.
78. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
79. McDonald v. Board of Elections Comm'n, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilots Comm'rs, 330 U.S.
552 (1947); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
80. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Baxtrom v. Herold,
383 U.S. 107 (1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536 (1965); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942).
81. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n,
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survive a higher level of judicial review: strict scrutiny. To survive
this degree of judicial scrutiny, a statutory classification must be
found necessary to meet a compelling state interest. Although the
Childers court assumed away any questions of suspect class or
fundamental rights, finding no rational nexus between a valid
state purpose and the basis for the classification,s8 this comment
will analyze more completely the equal protection issues these
acts present.
Accordingly, to determine the degree of judicial review, one
must first ascertain whether the classification impinges fundamental rights or is based upon suspect criteria. The Supreme
Court has identified various "indicia of suspectness: the class is
• . . saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history
of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position
of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process. 8' ' 3 Upon these indicia, the Court has found race84 and alienage 5 to be suspect bases
for .classsification. The Court, however, has specifically declared
that classifications based on illegitimacy are not suspect. 8 Although conceding that "illegitimacy is analogous in many respects to the personal characteristics that have been held to be
suspect," the Court concluded the analogy was insufficient. If
classifying children on the basis of their parents' "never marrying" is not suspect, then surely classifying children on the basis
of their parents' current marital status (divorced) cannot be suspect. Accordingly, neither the Dissolution Act nor the Parentage
Act creates suspect classifications.
The second inquiry necessary to determine the degree of judicial review is whether these acts impinge fundamental rights.
What rights are fundamental? While no one has satisfactorily
answered this question, the Supreme Court has found certain
fundamental rights within the term liberty. In defining what "liberty" the fourteenth amendment's due process clause protects,
the Court determined that the term, "[w]ithout doubt . . . .
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
334 U.S. 410 (1948); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
82. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
83. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
84. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
85. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
86. Trimble v. Gordon, 97 S. Ct. 1459 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
87. Trimble v. Gordon, 97 S. Ct. at 1463.
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right . . . to marry, establish a home and bring up children." 8
Although the rights to bring up children and direct their
education may be fundamental,89 due process of law necessarily
deprives parents of certain of these rights upon divorce or upon
"failure" to marry; one or both parents may be deprived of custody, and likewise one or both may be ordered to provide a periodic sum certain for the support of the child. If the amount of
such support does not impinge these fundamental rights, then
surely the duration of such support does not. Not only do these
acts not impinge fundamental rights, they insure the benefited
children's essential right to support. 0
Because these acts do not infringe any constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights or involve suspect classifications, the
courts are restricted to the traditional equal protection review: is
there a rational nexus between the basis of the classification and
a valid state purpose? The legislature, in the first instance, determines whether this nexus exists;"' the courts must uphold the
legislature's determination unless they conclude that the classification is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, inequitable, and
82
unjust.
Accordingly, to assure equal protection of the laws "[wihen
the classification in such a law is called into question, if any state
of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the
existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted
must be assumed." 93 Courts have found not only that married
parents are more likely to continue to support their children beyond minority than are divorced parents or parents who never
marry,94 but also that minor children of divorced or "single" parents are in greater need of post-majority support than are minor
children whose parents remain married until their children attain
majority; 5 the Washington legislature could have reached the
88. Meyers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
89. Id.; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
90. "[Olnce a state posits a judicially enforceable right on behalf of children to
needed support from their natural fathers there is no constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an essential right to a child simply because her natural father has
not married her mother." Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973).
91. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957);
Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
92. McDonald v. Board of Elections Comm'n, 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
93. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
94. Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 224 P. 264 (1926) (dictum).
95. Jackman v. Short, 165 Or. 626, 109 P.2d 860 (1941). Although Jackman dealt with
the greater need of minor children of divorced parents for college education, college education became an element of post-majority support when the age of majority was lowered
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same conclusions based upon the judiciary's findings. Legislatures have especially broad discretion in establishing classifications for social, welfare, and economic legislation;" accordingly,
Washington's legislature acts well within its discretion authorizing post-majority support orders for children protected by the
Dissolution Act and the Parentage Act, and not for children of
married parents.
The Washington Supreme Court's disposition of the Childers
appeal and its ultimate construction of the Uniform Parentage
Act will have their greatest impact on awards for post-majority
education. Washington courts have long recognized that a parent
separated from his children is less likely and less willing to provide for higher education expenses." Resolution of the postmajority support question in favor of court ordered post-majority
support will give courts discretion to offset, in appropriate circumstances, the harm caused a child resulting from the deprivation of a parent's guidance and direction by providing extended
institutional education and guidance. Although the courts cannot
coerce married parents into providing similar support, 8 adult
children of married parents are usually in less need of additional
guidance. A conclusion that these statutes do not authorize
post-majority support will compound the harm resulting from
maturing under the guidance of a single parent.
In conclusion, the Washington legislature has enacted new
provisions for ordering child support upon a declaration of the
parent-child relationship or upon dissolution of the parents' marriage. Although the state's courts have not yet considered whether
the Uniform Parentage Act permits support for adult children,
Washington appellate courts have reached conflicting conclusions as to the effect of the Dissolution of Marriage Act on court
ordered post-majority support. Careful analysis of the language
to eighteen in 1971.

WASH. REV. CODE

§ 26.28.010 (1976).

96. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) (acknowledging the principle, but striking down the classification as completely arbitrary);
Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
97. Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 244 P. 264 (1926).
98. Courts could require that married parents support their adult children if the state
supreme court declared that the legislature, by enacting the Parentage Act and the Dissolution Act, had expressed a new state policy: that all parents should support their dependent children. This, of course, would require the court to extend the state policy embodied
in these two acts beyond the circumstances to which the acts directly apply. For a decision
employing this reasoning, see Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
Such a decision would obviate all equal protection issues.
99. Jackman v. Short, 165 Or. 626, 109 P.2d 860 (1941).
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of each act, however, indicates that the legislature intended each
to authorize courts to order post-majority support. Deletion of the
term "minor" in the new dissolution statute's support provisions,
the term's absence from the Uniform Parentage Act's support
provision, and its presence throughout both acts in nonsupport
related sections support this conclusion. Such an analysis will
authorize Washington courts to provide support for dependent
children who have shown continued need or, in appropriate circumstances, the capacity to benefit from additional education.
Continued dependence, rather than the age of majority, will be a
fresh breeze sustaining the butterfly's ascent from its broken cocoon.
George T. Cowan

